An Experimental Study of Sex Segregation in the Swedish Labour Market: Is Discrimination the Explanation? by Carlsson, Magnus & Rooth, Dan-Olof
IZA DP No. 3811
An Experimental Study of Sex Segregation in the
Swedish Labour Market:



























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study
of Labor
November 2008 
An Experimental Study of Sex Segregation 
in the Swedish Labour Market: 




















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 














An Experimental Study of Sex Segregation in the Swedish 
Labour Market: Is Discrimination the Explanation?
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This paper studies whether sex discrimination is the cause of sex segregation in the Swedish 
labour market. The correspondence testing (CT) method was used, which entails two 
qualitatively identical applications, one with a female name and one with a male name, being 
sent to employers advertising for labour. The results show that females have a somewhat 
higher callback rate to interview in female-dominated occupations, while in male-dominated 
occupations there is no evidence of any difference. The conclusion is that the sex 
segregation prevailing in the Swedish labour market cannot be explained by discrimination in 
hiring. Instead, the explanation must be found on the supply side.  
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1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction 1. Introduction       
The employment rate for females in the Swedish labour market is among the highest 
in  the  world.1  However,  from  an  international  perspective  the  Swedish  labour 
market is also highly segregated based on sex (le Grand, 1997; Löfström, 2005).2 
Occupational segregation between the sexes is in fact greater than the segregation 
between natives and immigrants (Ekberg and Rooth, 2004). Females tend to work in 
healthcare,  education  and  the  detail  trade,  whereas  typical  male  jobs  are 
engineering,  construction  work  and  truck  driving.3  Interestingly,  occupational 
segregation explains a significant part of the non-adjusted sex wage gap in Sweden, 
which is about 16 percent.4 Wages are on average lower for both males and females 
in occupations with a high share of females, and higher in occupations with a low 
share  of  females.  Two  important  questions  arise:  1)  why  is  the  labour  market 
segregated with respect to sex, and 2) why are female jobs paid less? 
This study deals with the first question by studying a factor that potentially 
supports the prevalent segregation, namely the existence of sex discrimination in 
employment.5 To measure the existence of sex discrimination, the correspondence 
testing  (henceforth  CT)  method  is  used.  Internationally,  various  forms  of  field 
experiments  such  as  CT  have  become  an  increasingly  common  method  for 
demonstrating both ethnic and sex discrimination (Riach and Rich, 2002; 2006). CT 
entails the researcher submitting qualitatively identical written job applications for 
actual  advertised  vacancies.  The  name  assigned  to  the  applications  is  the  only 
difference, and reflect in this case the sex of the individual – one female and one 
male  name.  Each  sent  resumé  is  then  recorded  in  terms  of  whether  or  not  the 
applicant is invited to interview. The procedure is repeated for a sufficient number of 
vacancies in order to obtain a representative result. If the callback rates for the male 
and female applicant are significantly different, it must be due to sex discrimination 
                                                 
1  72.1  percent  of  women  16–64  years  old  were  employed  in  2006  (Labour  Force  Survey,  Statistics 
Sweden, 2006). 
2 In this article, segregation is simply defined as the share of females. An occupation is not segregated if 
50  percent of  the employees  are  males/females.  An occupation is  completely  segregated  if  0  or  100 
percent of the employees are males/females. 
3 Statistics Sweden, 2006. 
4 Statistics Sweden, 2006. 
5  In  this  article,  employer  discrimination  is  defined  as  occurring  when  two  individuals  are  treated 
unequally in a hiring situation, even though their productive characteristics observed by the employer 
are identical.   2 
since  CT  ensures  that  all  individual  productive  characteristics  are controlled  for, 
something that is usually hard to accomplish using register data analysis. 
The  degree  of  sex  discrimination  in  13  different  occupations  is  analysed, 
including male-dominated, mixed and female-dominated jobs, making it possible to 
analyse  its  relationship  with  segregation.  Finally,  the  characteristics  of 
discriminating  employers  are  examined.  The  results  reveal  that  females  have  a 
somewhat  higher  callback  rate  in  female-dominated  and  mixed  occupations 
compared to males. In male-dominated occupations there is, perhaps surprisingly, 
no evidence of any differences in the probability of being invited to interview. Some 
simple calculations show that the slight difference in callback rate cannot explain 
the  substantial  sex  segregation  prevailing  in  the  Swedish  labour  market.  The 
conclusion is that the driving force must be found on the supply side. 
Focusing  on  the  firm  level,  there  are still  individual  employers  treating  the 
applicants  differently.  Using  this  variation  to  analyse  the  characteristics  of 
employers shows that on the firm level neither the sex composition of employees nor 
the  sex  of  the  recruiter  influence  the  difference  in  callback  rate  between  the 
applicants. Further, public sector employers are, perhaps surprisingly, less likely to 
invite female applicants than males. 
The  next  section  presents  an  overview  of  some  existing  theories  explaining 
discrimination  and  segregation  in  the  labour  market.  Section  3  describes  the 
method,  Section  4  summarises  previous  research,  and  Section  5  discusses  data 
gathering  and  presents  the  descriptive  results.  Section  6  presents  the  empirical 
analysis, and interpretations and conclusions are presented in Sections 7 and 8. 
 
2. Segregation and discrimination 2. Segregation and discrimination 2. Segregation and discrimination 2. Segregation and discrimination       
Sociologists  and  economists  have  proposed  various  theories  to  explain  sex 
segregation  in  the  labour  market.  On  the  demand  side  it  is  the  existence  of 
discrimination that can lead to segregation.6 Sociologists explain discrimination as 
                                                 
6 The supply side can also affect the degree of segregation (this is kept constant in this experiment). On 
the  supply  side,  sociologists’  and  economists’  explanations  also  differ.  The  simplest  sociological 
explanation is that individuals are socialised to an idea of female and male jobs when growing up 
(England,  2005).  Classical  economists, on  the other  hand,  maintain  that individuals  strive  towards 
maximising lifetime income, and that women are more likely to wish to combine work and family life 
(Polachek, 1981; 1985).   3 
employers having a socially constructed image of what constitutes male and female 
jobs  (England,  2005).  This  view  is  probably  in  line  with  what  economists  call 
statistical  discrimination.  This  implies  that  employers  expect  a  male  to  be  more 
productive in occupations viewed as male jobs and females to be more productive in 
occupations viewed as female jobs (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). This is the first type 
of  statistical  discrimination  where  employers  classify  individuals  on  the  basis  of 
group belonging, following the qualification of the average member of that group 
instead  of  the  qualifications  of  the  individual.  The  second  type  of  statistical 
discrimination implies that members of a group are discriminated against because 
employers  view  their  productivity  with  different  accuracy.  In  the  case  of  sex 
discrimination it may not be obvious why employers would observe male and female 
productivity with different precision. 
The  other  main  type  of  economic  discrimination  is  Beckerian  employer,  co-
worker and customer discrimination (Becker, 1957). Based on this theory, employers 
are against employing individuals from a certain group because of their negative 
preferences. Discrimination can therefore occur even if there are no differences in 
average productivity or productivity variance. In a similar way, co-workers can have 
objections  to  work  and  customers  can  be  against  engaging  in  transactions  with 
members of a certain group. In some cases these theories predict a segregated labour 
market.7 
       
3. Method 3. Method 3. Method 3. Method       
Estimating  the  degree  of  sex  discrimination  in  the  labour  market  is  an  often 
demanding task. If the analysis is based on register data, one can rarely exclude the 
existence of variables that are unobserved by the researcher but observed by the 
employer. If such unobservable variables are present and also correlated with the 
individual’s sex, the estimated parameter of discrimination will be biased. 
To  make  inferences  about  discrimination  from  interview  data  is  also 
problematic. Job seekers may overstate or understate the degree of discrimination, 
and  employers  won’t  necessarily  communicate  their  true  attitudes  about  certain 
                                                 
7 For a detailed discussion of the different cases when segregation is predicted, see Altonji and Blank 
(1999).   4 
groups,  and  even  if  they  do  so,  attitudes  are  not  automatically  consistent  with 
behaviour. 
The main advantage with the CT method is that it ensures that the researcher 
observes exactly the same variables as the employers. This is guaranteed by the 
construction of the experiment, where qualitatively identical applications are sent to 
employers advertising for labour. The only difference between the applications is the 
names of the candidates, which are carefully chosen to signal being either male or 
female.  Having  sent  the  resumés,  the  number  of  invitations  to  interview  is 
calculated for each applicant. If a significant difference between the candidates is 
found,  it  must  be  the  case  that  employers  use  the  name  of  the  candidates  as  a 
decision variable – in other words, discrimination is observed. 
One criticism of CT is that the results cannot be regarded as representative of 
the labour market as a whole (Allosino et al., 2004). The reason is that in CT only a 
limited number of occupations are studied during a specific period of time. Further, 
jobs are usually only applied for via formal methods (job advertisements), whereas in 
real  life  a  considerable  number  of  job  offers  are  obtained  via  informal  search 
methods and networks (Segendorf and Rooth, 2006). However, such criticism applies 
to experimental methods in general and not just CT, since experimental methods are 
often restricted to study subsets of whole populations. 
A further criticism is that if a candidate is not invited to interview, it is not 
known  whether  the  candidate  would  have  got  the  job  if  an  interview  had  taken 
place. Regarding unequal treatment with respect to ethnicity, about 90 percent of all 
unequal treatment occurs in the stage of being called to an interview (Riach and 
Rich,  2002,  and  own  calculations).  Regarding  sex  discrimination,  it  has  not  been 
possible to carry out a similar calculation as a result of a lack of data, but it seems 
reasonable  to  assume  that  most  unequal  treatment  takes  place  at  the  interview 
stage.  If  the  applicant’s  sex  matters  in  the  hiring  decision  it  is  probably  most 
efficient to carry out the selection at an early stage in the recruitment process. 
 
4. Previous research using CT 4. Previous research using CT 4. Previous research using CT 4. Previous research using CT       
In  Europe,  Australia  and  the  US,  several  studies  of  sex  discrimination  in 
employment  have  been  conducted  by  applying  the  CT  method.  (see  Table  1).   5 
However, as far as we know, none of them links the results to sex segregation in a 
systematic  way.  In  Sweden,  CT  has  not  been  used  at  all  to  measure  sex 
discrimination.8 
Riach  and  Rich  (1987)  used  written  matching  applications  to  study  sex 
discrimination in Victoria/Australia in hiring accountants, computer professionals, 
gardeners,  and  industrial  relations  officers.  In  the  male-dominated  occupation  of 
gardening, males had a callback rate that was 25 percentage points higher. In the 
other occupations, non-significant differences were found (see Table 1).  
Neumark  et  al.  (1996)  studied  discrimination  in  restaurants  in 
Philadelphia/US. The experiment included two stages: the interview stage (similar 
to CT), which determined whether the candidates were called to an interview or not, 
and  the  job  offer  stage  (audit  testing),  where  real  people  attended  an  interview. 
Matching  pairs,  consisting  of  one  female  and  one  male,  applied  for  jobs  as 
waitresses/waiters in restaurants of three different price classes – high, medium and 
low. Unlike in other studies, jobs were also applied for at restaurants that had not 
advertised for labour (so-called blind applications). They found that females were 
discriminated against in the high-price restaurant category, and males tended to be 
discriminated against in the low-priced restaurants (see Table 1). One interpretation 
is that preference-based customer discrimination exists, such that customers prefer 
a  male  waiter  in  more  luxury  restaurants  and  a  female  waitress  in  simpler 
restaurants, which was taken into account by the recruiter. 
Weichselbaumer (2004) conducted a CT in Vienna/Austria by sending written 
applications  to  employers  that  posted  vacancy  ads  in  daily  papers.  She  tried  to 
emphasise  personality  in  the  applications  with  the  aim  of  influencing  sex 
stereotypes,  and  thus  identifying  preference-based  discrimination  from  statistical 
discrimination.  Three  applications  were  sent,  one  male  and  two  female.  The 
personality  of  one  female  was  made  more  masculine,  and  the  other  was  more 
traditionally feminine, based on what Weichselbaumer (2004) maintained as typical 
male and female qualities. On the basis of this construction, she argued that the 
masculine  female  signalled  the  qualities  that  are  considered  to  be  important  in 
male-dominated  occupations.  The  hypothesis  was  that  if  employers  in  male-
                                                 
8 There is, however, a quasi-experiment (Edin and Lagerström, 2006)   6 
dominated occupations discriminated less against the masculine female than against 
the  feminine  one,  it  was  a  result  of  less  statistical  discrimination.  However,  the 
results  do  not  show  any  significant  differences  in  discrimination  vis-à-vis  the 
masculine female and feminine female. 
Weichselbaumer’s  (2004)  interpretation  of  these  results  is  that  sex 
discrimination is an effect of preferences, and that sex per se and not productive-
relevant  personality  drives  labour  market  discrimination.  However,  such  an 
interpretation requires the applications to contain complete information about all 
relevant  productive  characteristics,  otherwise  the  employer  may  still  use  sex 
stereotypes to predict missing information, hence statistical discrimination may be 
present  in  any  case.  Regardless  of  the  type  of  discrimination  observed, 
Weichselbaumer (2004) found that females were discriminated against in the male-
dominated occupation of computer specialists, and males were discriminated against 
in the female-dominated occupations of accountants and secretaries (see Table 1).       
Riach and Rich (2006) sent matching pairs of written applications to employers 
in London/UK who advertised vacancies in daily papers and on the Internet. Four 
different  occupational  categories  were  investigated.  They  found  that  males  were 
discriminated against in the female-dominated secretarial occupation, and females 
were discriminated against in the male-dominated engineering occupation. For the 
mixed occupations of accountants and computer professionals, males were found to 
be at a disadvantage (see Table 1). 
 
*** Table 1 here***  
 
5. Data gathering and results 5. Data gathering and results 5. Data gathering and results 5. Data gathering and results       
This section describes the motivation for the choice of occupations analysed in the 
experiment  and  the construction  of  the  applications,  explains  how  the  data  were 
gathered, and provides descriptive results. 
 
5.1 Occupations and geographical regions 5.1 Occupations and geographical regions 5.1 Occupations and geographical regions 5.1 Occupations and geographical regions       
To  test  whether  sex  discrimination  exists  and  maintains  sex  segregation  in  the 
labour  market,  it  is  necessary  to  study  both  female-  and  male-dominated   7 
occupations.  It  is  also interesting  to  compare  the  degree  of  sex  discrimination  in 
occupations with  different  qualification  levels  and  in  both  the private  and public 
sectors. In addition, to achieve reasonable progress in the collection of observations, 
the demand for labour has to be sufficiently high in the included occupations. 
The  following  13  occupations  fulfilled  the  research  requirements:  computer 
professionals, motor-vehicle drivers, construction workers, business sales assistants, 
teachers (preschool, lower secondary school language and maths/science, and upper 
secondary school), restaurant workers, accountants, cleaners, shop sales assistants, 
and nurses.  
For practical reasons, data collection was restricted to the two major cities of 
Sweden: Stockholm and Gothenburg.9 For instance, it was necessary to subscribe to 
phone lines with automatic answering machines and allocate real postal addresses 
for  the  applicants,  making  it  possible  for  employers  to  establish  contact.  Two 
separate  phone  lines  were  needed  for  each  region  and  area  code,  one  for  each 
applicant, placing limits upon the number of regions that could be studied. Access to 
real postal addresses was also limited, with reliance upon borrowed C/O addresses in 
each region for the two applicants. 
 
5.2 The applications 5.2 The applications 5.2 The applications 5.2 The applications       
The applications consisted of a brief personal letter on one page and a CV on another 
page,  and  were  constructed  to  be  realistic  even  though  they  did  not  describe  an 
existing person. As considerable competition from other job seekers was expected, 
the applicants had to be well qualified. 
For each occupation, about 20 resumés belonging to real persons available at 
the homepage of the Swedish Employment Service were used as templates. These 
applications  were  combined  and  colleagues  at  Kalmar  University  were  consulted 
regarding  whether  they  recognised  any  qualitative  differences.  If  they  did,  the 
applications  were  adjusted  and  recalibrated,  and  the  iterative  process  continued 
until  no  qualitative  differences  were  perceived  (see  Appendix  B  for  example 
resumés). Finally, three standardised applications for each occupation were obtained 
stating identical qualifications but with a somewhat different typeface and layout to 
                                                 
9 The experiment was also started in Malmö, the third largest city in Sweden, but there were not 
enough jobs available to make progress.    8 
avoid  raising  suspicion.  A  post  ex  sensitivity  analysis  shows  that  there  was  no 
difference in the probability of being invited to interview for different applications. 
The choice of the individuals’ names was vital, since the name was used to 
signal the sex of the applicant. The most frequently found female first names, male 
first names and last names in Sweden were chosen.10  
Relatively young individuals who had recently entered the labour market were 
studied  for  two  main  reasons.  First,  sex  discrimination  is  often  discussed  in  the 
context  of  pregnancy  and  childcare.  One  hypothesis  is  that  females  are 
discriminated against because they are more likely to quit work due to pregnancy 
and  childcare,  disrupting  their  employment.  Therefore,  it  is  interesting  to  study 
individuals at an age where they are likely to raise a family. Second, it would be 
very  demanding  to create  convincing  applications  for  older  candidates  covering  a 
whole working life. The age of the applicants was therefore set to 24–29 years old, 
depending  on  the  required  education  and  work  experience  for  the  particular 
profession. The amount of work experience given in each occupation was two to five 
years, based on the expected competition from other job seekers. 
The  job  openings  were  collected  from  the  Swedish  Employment  Agency’s 
homepage, the site in Sweden where most vacancies are found.11 Only employers 
accepting  applications  sent  by  email  were  included  in  the  experiment,  which 
constitutes the majority of employers in Sweden. 
The procedure to apply for a job was to randomly pick a male and a female 
name from the pool of names and then make a random choice of two applications for 
each  candidate.  Relevant  contact  information  was  then  attached,  consisting  of  a 
telephone  number  (with  an  automatic  answering  machine),  an  email  address 
registered at a large Internet provider, and a real postal address always referring to 
similar  neighbourhoods.  However,  none  of  the  employers  invited  any  of  the 
applicants via regular mail. To avoid giving any of the candidates the systematic 
advantage of having his/her application being sent first, the order was alternated. 
                                                 
10  For  males,  the  first  names  Erik,  Karl  and  Lars  and  the  last  names  Andersson,  Pettersson  and 
Nilsson were used. For women, the first names Eva, Anna and Maria and the last names Karlsson, 
Eriksson and Johansson were used. These are the most common names according to Statistics Sweden 
(2006).  Sensitivity  analysis  shows  that  different  names  (within  sex)  had  no  statistically  significant 
effect upon the probability of being called to an interview. 
11 By law, employers have to report vacancies to the Employer Agency. The law is not enforced, but 
most vacancies are still found there.   9 
The  applications  were  usually  sent  with  one  day’s  delay,  and  to  minimise  the 
inconvenience for employers, all interview offers were immediately declined. 
 
5.3 Firm/workplace and recruiter information 5.3 Firm/workplace and recruiter information 5.3 Firm/workplace and recruiter information 5.3 Firm/workplace and recruiter information       
By  collecting  information  about  the  firms  participating  in  the  experiment  it  was 
possible  to  analyse  the  distinguishing  characteristics  of  firms  that  treat  the 
applicants differently. The sex of the recruiter was obtained from the job ads. It was 
also  possible  to  identify  the  workplaces  in  Statistics  Sweden’s  business  register 
using  workplace  IDs  (so-called  CFAR-no,  see  www.scb.se).12  From  the  registers, 
information was obtained on the share of male employees at the firm, the number of 
employees at the workplace and the firm as a whole (if more than one workplace), 
the number of workplaces of the firm, and whether it is a public sector employer or 
not.13  
Analysing  how these  variables relate  to  unequal  treatment is  interesting  in 
several ways. For example, information on the sex of the recruiter and the share of 
males at the firm may indicate the role that segregation plays in discrimination at 
the firm level and what type of discrimination is observed. For example, suppose 
that  discrimination  is  present,  if  preferences  are  the  source  it  is  expected  by 
definition that the treatment of males/females changes with the sex of the recruiter 
and  the  share  of  male/female  employees.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  only  statistical 
discrimination is left as an explanation of unequal treatment. 
The  number  of  employees  at  the  firm  can  also  reveal  whether  unequal 
treatment is linked to such things as the experience of hiring staff. Finally, in light 
of the political debate in Sweden about equal opportunities in the labour market, it 
is interesting to analyse whether public sector employers treat the applicants more 
equally compared to private employers.  
 
5.4 Descriptive results 5.4 Descriptive results 5.4 Descriptive results 5.4 Descriptive results       
                                                 
12 Company IDs were identified from combining information on firm name and address found in the job 
ad with information in Statistics Sweden’s business register available on the Internet.    
13 In 63 percent of the cases the firm only has one workplace, hence firm and workplace form the same 
unit.   10 
Table 2 shows the aggregate results for the Stockholm and Gothenburg regions.14 It 
demonstrates that a total of 3,228 applications were sent to 1,614 job openings. The 
four possible outcomes in CT are neither applicant invited, both invited, only the 
male applicant invited, and only the female applicant invited. From the first row it 
can be read that in 982 cases neither individual was invited to an interview, while in 
632 cases at least one was. In 336 cases both individuals were invited, in 125 cases it 
was only the male, and in 171 cases it was only the female. The callback rates for 
the male and female applicant are 0.29 and 0.31 respectively. The last column shows 
that the difference in callback rate is approximately two percentage points at the 
mean.  However,  this  result  does  not  necessarily  apply  to  the  labour  market  in 
general since more female-dominated occupations were included in the experiment. 
Instead, dividing the occupations based on the share of males/females allows the 
analysis to be linked to segregation.       
The remaining rows in the table show the result for each occupation, being 
ordered  by  the  share  of  males/females  in  the  occupation.  Male-dominated 
occupations are defined as those with more than 2/3 males, mixed occupations as 
those having between 1/3 and 2/3 males, and finally, female-dominated occupations 
as those with less than 1/3 males (information taken from Statistics Sweden, 2006). 
Male-dominated occupations include computer professionals, motor-vehicle drivers 
and construction workers; the total number of jobs applied for of this type was 248. 
The callback rate is on average four percentage points higher for males compared to 
females  among  these  occupations.  Mixed  occupations  comprise  business  sales 
assistants, lower secondary school teachers (language), and upper secondary school 
teachers. The mean result for this group is that the callback rate for males is four 
percentage points lower compared to females. The occupations categorised as female-
dominated  include  restaurant  workers,  accountants,  cleaners,  preschool  teachers, 
shop sales assistants, lower secondary school teachers (maths/science), and nurses. 
The callback rate for males for the group as a whole is four percentage points lower 
than  for  females.  The discussion  of  the  results  by  occupation  follows  in  the  next 
section.  
 
                                                 
14 The relative callback rates do not differ significantly between Stockholm and Gothenburg. Therefore, 
only the aggregate result is presented.   11 
*** Table 2 here *** 
 
6. Empirical analysis 6. Empirical analysis 6. Empirical analysis 6. Empirical analysis       
In this section, the differences in the probability of being invited to interview for the 
male  and  female  applicants  are  analysed  using  all  3,228  applications  and  1,614 
workplaces.  The  goal  is  to  study  whether  females  and  males  have  different 
probabilities of being invited depending on the occupation, and the share of females 
in the occupation. Thereafter it is estimated which, if any, workplace and recruiter 
characteristics  influence  these  differences  using  the  2,996  applications  and  1,498 
workplaces identified in the registers.15 Of particular interest is whether the share 
of females at the firm and the sex of the recruiter have an impact on explaining sex 
differences in the probability of being invited to interview.  
 
6.1 Sex differences in invitation probability 6.1 Sex differences in invitation probability 6.1 Sex differences in invitation probability 6.1 Sex differences in invitation probability       
Three different probit models were used to analyse the probability of being invited to 
interview  for  males  and  females,  all  with  the  callback  dummy  as  the  dependent 
variable reporting the effect of discrete changes in the explaining dummy variables. 
 Model 1 in Table 3 regresses the callback dummy on the female dummy alone. 
As can be seen, having a female name increases the probability of being invited to 
interview  by  an  average  three  percentage  points  (significant  at  the  one  percent 
level).  
Model  2  regresses  the  callback  indicator  on  the  category  variables  of  male-
dominated,  mixed  or  female-dominated  occupation  (where  the  male-dominated 
occupation is the benchmark). The category variables are also interacted with the 
female  dummy  to  reveal  any  differences  in  the  probability  of  being  invited  to 
interview between sexes within the three groups of occupations. From the second 
column of Model 2 it can be read that in male-dominated occupations, the effect on 
the probability of being invited to interview of having a female name is negative but 
insignificant.  In  mixed  occupations,  on  the  other  hand,  having  a  female  name 
increases  the  probability  of  being  invited  to  interview  by  four  percentage  points 
                                                 
15 Hence, 93 percent of the workplaces were identified in the registers.    12 
(significant at the 10 percent level). In female-dominated occupations, the impact is 
positive and an average four percentage points (significant at the one percent level). 
 
      *** Table 3 here *** 
 
  The next model reports the corresponding effects estimated at the occupational 
level.  For  a  person  with  a  male  name  it  is  evident  that  the probability  of  being 
invited to interview varies across occupations (first column of Model 3). The lowest 
probability  is  found  for  cleaners  (17  percentage  points  less  than  for  computer 
professionals) and the highest for preschool teachers (40 percentage points higher 
than for computer professionals). From the second column of Model 3 it is clear that 
having  a  female  name  significantly  increases  the  probability  of  being  invited  to 
interview  for  the  following  occupations:  business  sales  assistants  (six  percentage 
points),  restaurant  workers  (20  percentage  points),  accountants  (12  percentage 
points),  and  preschool  teachers  (six  percentage  points).  For  the  remaining 
occupations, the estimated differences in invitation probability between the sexes 
are insignificant. 
  To  further  explore  the  link  between  the  difference  in  callback  rate  and  the 
share of females in the occupation, the correlation coefficient between the two is 
estimated. If unequal treatment is an important variable in explaining segregation, 
one would expect to find a negative correlation, that is, a greater difference between 
the callback rate for the male and female applicant in occupations where the share 
of females is lower. Table A1 reports the difference in callback rate and the share of 
females for each occupation.16 The correlation coefficient carries the negative sign, 
but it is statistically insignificant different from zero. Hence, there is no statistical 
evidence that the difference in callback rate is correlated with the share of females 
in the occupation. 
  To  sum  up  the  analysis  so  far,  on  average,  in  male-dominated,  mixed  and 
female-dominated occupations, the difference in callback rate between the sexes is 
small. Somewhat larger differences are found in particular occupations, especially 
                                                 
16  The  share  of  females  in  each  occupation  is  taken  from  Statistics  Sweden  (2006).  Table  A1  also 
contains  the  occupational  classification  with  respect  to  skill.  No  significant  relationship  was  found 
between  the  difference  in  callback  rate  and  the  classification.  The  occupational  classification  is  a 
simplification of the Swedish Standard Classification of Occupations (Statistics Sweden, 2006)   13 
female-dominated occupations where the female candidate has a higher probability 
of being invited to interview in some cases. In none of the occupations does the male 
applicant have a significantly higher callback rate. No correlation is found between 
the difference in callback rate and the share of females in the occupation. 
 
 
6.1 Factors influencing the probability of being invited 6.1 Factors influencing the probability of being invited 6.1 Factors influencing the probability of being invited 6.1 Factors influencing the probability of being invited       
Even  if  the  differences  in  callback  rate  between  males  and  females  on  the 
occupational level are small in most cases, there still exists variation in how the 
applicants are treated at the firm level, which is utilized in this section. The relevant 
variables to analyse, where data are available, are the sex of the recruiting person, 
the share of male employees at the firm, the number of employees at the workplace, 
and  whether  the  firm  is  a  public  or  private  sector  employer  (see  Table  A2  for 
descriptive statistics). 
To investigate which, if any, of the attributes influence the difference in callback 
rate  between  the  two  applicants,  the  callback  dummy  is  now  regressed  on  the 
workplace/recruiter  characteristics  and  the  interaction  of  the  variables  with  the 
female dummy. The extent to which a variable is associated with a difference in 
callback rate is given by the interaction effect.17  
In  a  similar  way  to  the  descriptive  results,  the  data  are  divided  into  male-
dominated,  mixed  and  female-dominated  occupations  in  order  to  allow  for  a 
heterogeneous impact of the variables in the three categories.18 The first model is 
estimated on all observations in male-dominated occupations without controls for 
occupation and firm size. No marginal effects are significantly different from zero. 
The  estimated  impact  of  being  a  public  sector  employer  is,  however,  large  and 
negative. Model 2 repeats the analysis but adds occupational and firm size fixed 
effects. Most estimates are similar to before, but there is a tendency for females to 
have a higher probability of being invited to interview if the recruiter is male, which 
might be the opposite of what is expected.  
 
                                                 
17 These are the estimated marginal changes in probability for the continuous variables and estimated 
discrete changes for dummy variables. For convenience, both are referred to simply as marginal effects. 
18 The models have also been estimated for separate occupations and for the whole data set, but no 
further significant results were found.   14 
    *** Table 4 here *** 
 
In  mixed  occupations,  public  sector  employers  are  associated  with  a  lower 
probability for females of being invited to interview. In Model 3, the effect of the 
interaction of the public sector and the female dummy is estimated as significant at 
the five percent level. The absolute value of the point estimate is even higher with 
fixed  effects  controls  included  (Model  4),  but  the  precision  is  lower.  From  the 
estimates of Model 4 it can also be seen that employers with less than 20 employees 
are  associated  with  a  significantly  lower  probability  of  females  being  invited  to 
interview compared to males. 
In  female-dominated  occupations,  the  probability  of  female  applicants  being 
invited to interview by public sector employers is lower than male applicants. The 
marginal  effect  is  significant  at  the  five  percent  level  both  between  and  within 
occupations (Models 5 and 6). The estimates of Model 5 reveal also that the share of 
males at the firm is significantly associated with differences in the probability of 
being invited to interview for males and females. A one percent increase in the share 
of  males  is  associated  with,  perhaps  surprisingly,  a  16  percentage  point  higher 




7. Interp 7. Interp 7. Interp 7. Interpretations retations retations retations       
If the hypothesis that sex discrimination is an important factor in explaining sex 
segregation in the labour market is true, it is expected that females have a lower 
probability of being invited to interview in male-dominated occupations, and vice 
versa. In general, very weak support for the hypothesis is found. First of all, the 
correlation  coefficient between  the  difference  in  callback  rate  between  males  and 
females and the share of females in the occupation is not significantly different from 
zero. Moreover, in male-dominated occupations, no evidence is found of females and 
males having different probability of being invited to interview. In female-dominated 
occupations,  females  have  on  average  four  percentage  point  higher  callback  rate 
compared to males. In these occupations, a substantial majority of employees are   15 
females, the share varying from 68 percent for restaurant workers to 92 percent for 
preschool teachers (see Table A1). But can the four percentage point higher callback 
rate  for  females  really  explain  the  considerable  female  dominance  in  these 
occupations?  
The  answer  is  clearly  no  and  can  be  illustrated  by  a  simple  “back  of  the 
envelope” calculation. Assume, as in CT, that females and males supply an identical 
type and amount of labour and, as is found in this experiment, that females have a 
30 percent and males a 26 percent callback rate to interview. Assume also that the 
share  of  vacancies  that  are  filled  by  females  and  males  is  proportional  to  their 
relative  callback  rate  to  interview.  This  is  a  reasonable  approximation  if  most 
unequal treatment occurs when applicants are chosen for the interview stage and 
not  when  the  interview  actually  takes  place.  Then  it  follows  that  the  share  of 





 − ≈ 1
26
30
 percent higher compared to 
the  share  that  is  filled  with  males,  since  the  female  callback  rate  is  15  percent 
higher  than  the  male  callback  rate.  Consequently,  out  of  100  vacancies, 
approximately 54 are filled by females and approximately 46 are filled by males (54 
being  15  percent  higher  than  46).  Suppose  also  that  no  discrimination  occurs  in 
firing, and that who quits a job is random.  
Under these assumptions, eventually the share of females in the sector will be 
54  percent  and  the  share  of  males  46  percent.  This  is  a  much  lower  degree  of 
segregation than is observed in reality. The obvious conclusion is that such a small 
difference in callback rate of four percentage points cannot explain the segregation 
that exists in female-dominated occupations.19 Consequently, since the demand side 
cannot explain segregation, the supply side must. 
However,  if  discrimination  cannot  explain  segregation  in  female-dominated 
occupations, it may still explain segregation in some particular occupations. What 
about restaurant workers and accountants, where the largest statistically significant 
difference in callback rates are found? For restaurant workers the callback rate is 19 
percent for females and eight percent for males. When a similar calculation as before 
is performed, it follows that the share of females would be 70 percent due to the 
                                                 
19 If discrimination was more prevalent in the past it may still explain segregation today. In the long 
run, however, that effect cannot persist.   16 
difference in callback rate. Thus, in this case, discrimination alone can explain sex 
segregation  since  the  share  of  females  in  reality  is  68  percent.  Turning  to  the 
accountants, the share of females that is predicted by the difference in callback rates 
is  62  percent  compared  to  the  observed  share  of  75  percent.  In  this  occupation, 
discrimination can also explain segregation to some extent. 
A  somewhat  different  callback  rate  for  females  and  males  is  also  found  in 
mixed  occupations.  This  result  cannot  be  explained  by  some  occupations  being 
female jobs and others being male jobs. Can the explanation instead be an existing 
stereotype about females being more diligent and reliable in general? Such a view 
may have arisen from females being more conscientious at school and doing better at 
both school and university. However, this finding seems to be driven solely by the 
business  sales  assistants  occupation  suggesting  that  customer  discrimination 
against  males  is  the  explanation.  Riach  and  Rich  (2006),  who  conducted  a  field 
experiment in London, arrived at a similar result, namely that females are preferred 
not only in female-dominated occupations, but also in mixed occupations. 
The  analysis  of  what  characterises  workplaces  that  act  on  the  name  of  the 
applicant shows that the sex of the recruiter at the workplace and the fraction of 
males at the firm have basically no influence upon the difference in callback rate. In 
other words, no obvious link between sex composition and discrimination exists at 
the firm level either. This result might be expected with the small differences in 
treatment  found  at  the  occupational  level  in  mind.  However,  there  is  some 
surprising  evidence  that  male  recruiters  in  male-dominated  occupations  prefer 
female candidates (see Models 1 and 2 in Table 4) and that females’ chances increase 
relative to males’ chances with the share of males in female-dominated occupations 
(see Models 5 and 6 in Table 4). 
These findings should rule out the presence of preference-based discrimination. 
For  instance,  if  the  Beckerian  type  of  employer  discrimination  is  present,  it  is 
expected  that  females’  chances  are  lower,  not  higher  or  unaffected,  if  a  male  is 
responsible  for  recruitment  as  opposed  to  a  female.  Further,  if  preference-based 
employee discrimination exists, the probability for females to be invited to interview 
is  expected  to  diminish,  not  increase  or  be  unaffected,  as  the  share  of  males 
increases.  Therefore,  the  differences  in  callback  rate  that  are  still  found,  in 
particular  among  female-dominated  occupations,  are  most  likely  driven  by   17 
stereotypes regarding which occupations are suitable for males and females. To some 
extent, among both females and males, a common idea may exist that females are 
more productive in female-dominated occupations. 
Bagüés  and  Esteve-Volart  (2006)  arrived  at  a  similar  conclusion  about  the 
source of sex discrimination by analysing data obtained from a natural experiment 
in the public sector in France. They studied how the sex composition of recruitment 
committees  affects  females’  chances  of  being  offered  a  job.  Their  chance  did  not 
improve, but rather diminished, when the proportion of females in the committee 
increased.  They  also  excluded  preference  discrimination  as  an  explanation  for 
females not being selected in the employment process. 
The only characteristic significantly associated with the difference in callback 
rate is whether the firm is a public or private sector employer. Employers in the 
public sector treat female applicants more negatively compared to male applicants. 
An explanation could be that the public sector in Sweden includes heavily female-
dominated, top-down organisations with a general policy to increase the share of 
male employees. They may then select the male applicant when choosing between a 
male  and  a  female  candidate  with  similar  qualifications.  From  the  job 
advertisements  one  can  indeed  see  that  it  is  not  uncommon  for  public  sector 
employers to explicitly state that they encourage male applicants.  
 
 
8. Conclusions 8. Conclusions 8. Conclusions 8. Conclusions       
This  study  is  the  first  of  its  kind  to  use  CT  to  measure  the  degree  of  sex 
discrimination in the Swedish labour market and its link to sex segregation. We 
found  very  weak  support  for  discrimination  as  an  important  factor  in  explaining 
segregation. In male-dominated occupations there is no evidence of male and female 
applicants having different probability of being invited to an interview. In female-
dominated  occupations,  even  though  males  have  a  four  percentage  point  lower 
probability  of  being invited to  interview compared  to  females,  this difference  can 
only  explain  a  minor  part  of  the  substantial  segregation  prevailing  in  these 
occupations. The conclusion is that, in general segregation is not a result of present 
discrimination  but  rather  determined  by  labour  supply,  that  is,  by  females’  and   18 
males’  choice  of  education  and  occupation.  If  it  is  desirable  to  achieve  a  more 
integrated labour market, anti-segregation measures have to focus on the supply 
side. The only exception seems to be the restaurant workers occupation where the 
level  of  discrimination  found  in  the  experiment  is  able  to  explain  existing 
segregation. 
However,  it  is  important  to  mention  that  a  false  expectation  of  future 
discrimination when entering the labour market can still influence the supply side 
and the choice of profession. Discrimination in the past may also have contributed to 
today’s segregated labour market. 
Even though the differences in callback rate between males and females at the 
sector level are small, there is still variation at the firm level in how the applicants 
are treated. The analysis of this variation revealed two interesting findings. First, at 
the firm level, neither the sex composition of employees nor the sex of the recruiter 
influence the difference in male and female applicants’ chances of being invited to 
interview. This suggests that, among female-dominated occupations where females 
had  a  somewhat  higher  callback  rate,  preference-based  discrimination  should  be 
rejected as the explanation. Discrimination is rather driven by stereotypes common 
to both males and females. 
Second,  compared  to  private  sector  employers,  public  sector  employers  were 
found  to  be  more  likely  to  invite  male  applicants  to  interview  than  females.  An 
explanation of this can be that the public sector, which is heavily female-dominated 
in Sweden, is pushing to increase the share of males in the sector. 
Future  studies  should  investigate  the  existence  of  sex  discrimination  in  the 
appointment  of  managerial  jobs  in  which  sex  discrimination  is  often  assumed  to 
exist.   19 
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Appendix A Appendix A Appendix A Appendix A       
 
Table A1. Difference in callback rate, share of females, and skill requirement 
Occupation 
Difference in callback rate 






Construction workers  0.10  1  2 
Motor-vehicle drivers  0.03  7  2 
Nurses  0.04  91  3 
Upper secondary school teachers  0.03  53  3 
Lower secondary school teachers (math and science)   0.02  76  3 
Shop sales assistants  0.00  76  2 
Lower secondary school teachers (language)  0.00  66  3 
Computer professionals  -0.01  24  3 
Preschool teachers   -0.06  92  3 
Business sales assistants  -0.06  38  2 
Cleaners  -0.03  80  1 
Accountants  -0.08  75  3 
Restaurant workers  -0.11  68  1 
Notes: This table reports the difference in callback rate between males and females for each occupation 
together with the share of females in the occupation according to Statistics Sweden (2006) and the 
classification  of  the  occupations  according  to  a  simplification  of  Swedish  Standard  Classification  of 
Occupations,  Statistics  Sweden.  The  Pearson  Correlation  Coefficient  is  -0.45  (and  insignificant) 
between the difference in callback rate and the share of females in the occupation. The correlation 
between the difference in callback rate and the classification is 0.25 and insignificant.   23 
 









invited  Total 
Recruiter information           
  Male responsible  0.561  0.578  0.418  0.589  0.550 
Composition of employees           










Workplace characteristics           
  Employees : 0-19  0.588  0.609  0.511  0.582  0.571 
  Public sector  0.254  0.106  0.338  0.141  0.187 
Occupation fixed effects           
  Computer professionals  0.061  0.062  0.042  0.077  0.067 
  Motor-vehicle drivers  0.061  0.037  0.032  0.054  0.048 
  Construction  0.070  0.025  0.026  0.043  0.039 
  Business sales assistants  0.184  0.255  0.209  0.137  0.168 
  Lower secondary school teachers (language)  0.053  0.043  0.064  0.026  0.038 
  Teachers upper secondary school  0.079  0.043  0.035  0.036  0.040 
  Restaurant  0.026  0.106  0.026  0.111  0.086 
  Accountants  0.061  0.118  0.051  0.147  0.117 
  Cleaners  0.009  0.019  0.010  0.057  0.039 
  Preschool Teachers  0.140  0.155  0.289  0.047  0.116 
  Shop Sales  0.123  0.087  0.039  0.156  0.121 
  Lower secondary school teachers (math and science)   0.044  0.025  0.055  0.014  0.026 
  Nurses  0.088  0.025  0.122  0.095  0.093 
Firm size fixed effects           
  Employees : 0-9†  0.272  0.373  0.283  0.384  0.353 
  Employees : 10-99†  0.342  0.385  0.257  0.322  0.317 
  Employees : 100-†  0.386  0.242  0.460  0.294  0.330 










N  114  161  311  912  1498 
Notes: This table reports the mean characteristics for the firms identified in the registers (N=1498) 
showing  the  characteristics  for  firms  that  invited  1)  only  the  male  applicant,  2)  only  the  female 
applicant, 3) both applicants and 4) none of the applicants. All variables are measured at the work 
place level accept those marked with (†) which are at the firm level. For continuous variables standard 
deviations are reported in parenthesis.   24 
       





Male responsible  Equals one if a male is responsible for recruitment at workplace, else zero  
Males  Share of males at the firm 
Employees : 0-19  Equals one if the number of employees at workplace is between zero and nineteen, 
else zero 
Public sector  Equals one if workplace operates in the public sector, else zero 
Occupational fixed effects  Dummy variables assigned to one if the workplace belongs to the particular 
occupation, else zero 
Firm size fixed effects  Control for number of workplaces at firm and dummy variables controlling for 
whether the firm has 0-9, 10-99 or more than 100 employees 
Notes: This table describes the variables included in the empirical analysis of what characterize firms 
treating the applicants differently.  
         25 
Appendix B  Appendix B  Appendix B  Appendix B        
Example Application A (own translation of application for computer professionals). 
   26 
Example Application B (own translation of application for computer professionals). 
 
       
   27 
Example Application C (own translation of application for computer professionals).   28 
Tables Tables Tables Tables: 
 
Table 1. Previous studies  
Occupation  Study/Location  Applications (N) 
  Difference in  
Callback Rate 
(Male-Female) 
Accountants       
    Riach and Rich (2006), London/UK  339    -0.03* 
    Weichselbaumer (2004), Vienna/Austria  149    -0.03 
    Riach and Rich (1987), Victoria/Australia     383 (†)    0.02 
Computer professionals       
    Riach and Rich (2006), London/UK  130    -0.09*** 
    Riach and Rich (1987), Victoria/Australia      366 (††)    0.02 
    Weichselbaumer (2004), Vienna / Austria       205 (†††)    0.09*** 
Engineers       
    Riach and Rich (2006), London/UK  173     
0.05* 
Gardeners       
    Riach and Rich (1987), Victoria/Australia  148    0.25** 
Industrial relations officers       
    Riach and Rich (1987), Victoria/Australia  94    -0.02 
Secretaries       
    Weichselbaumer (2004), Vienna/ Austria  123     
-0.24*** 
    Riach and Rich (2006), London/UK  231    -0.10*** 
Waiters/Waitresses       
High-price restaurants       




     
    Neumark et al (1996), Philadelphia/US  (a)  21    0.19 
Waiters/Waitresses  
Low-price restaurants 
     
    Neumark et al (1996),  Philadelphia/US  (a)  21    -0.19 
Notes: This table reports results from previous studies using the CT method. The null hypothesis tested 
(last column) is “Both individuals are treated unfavourably equally often”. The critical value of the
2 χ at 
the one percent level of significance is 6.63 (***), at the five percent level of significance is 3.84 (**) and 
at the ten percent level of significance is 2.71 (*). (†) The sum of management accountants and payroll 
clerks.  (††)  The  sum  of  computer  analyst  programmers,  computer  operators  and  computer 
programmers. (†††) The sum of network technicians and computer programmers. (a) Neumark et al 
(1996) use blind applications (no job ads). Discrimination at the job offer stage is not reported in this 
table since the stage is not included in this study, see instead Neumark et al. (1996).   29 
 
Table 2. Descriptive results 



























(5 + 4)/(1) 
[7] 
Female 





Aggregated results  1614  982  632  336  125  171  0.29  0.31  -0.02 
                   
  Male-dominated  (a)  248  167  81  33  28  20  0.25  0.21  0.04 
    Computer professionals  106  73  33  14  9  10  0.22  0.23  -0.01 
    Motor-vehicle drivers  78  53  25  10  9  6  0.24  0.21  0.03 
    Construction workers  64  41  23  9  10  4  0.30  0.20  0.10 
                   
  Mixed (b)  402  201  201  106  39  56  0.36  0.40  -0.04 
    Business sales assistants  278  140  138  73  23  42  0.35  0.41  -0.06 
    Lower secondary school teachers (language)  60  25  35  21  7  7  0.47  0.47  0.00 
    Upper secondary school teachers   64  36  28  12  9  7  0.33  0.30  0.03 
                   
  Female-dominated (c)  964  614  350  197  58  95  0.26  0.30  -0.04 
    Restaurant workers  140  110  30  8  3  19  0.08  0.19  -0.11 
    Accountants  186  140  46  17  7  22  0.13  0.21  -0.08 
    Cleaners  62  54  8  4  1  3  0.08  0.11  -0.03 
    Preschool teachers   184  45  139  96  16  27  0.61  0.67  -0.06 
    Shop sales assistants  200  156  44  14  15  15  0.15  0.15  0.00 
    Lower secondary school teachers (math and science)  42  14  28  19  5  4  0.57  0.55  0.02 
    Nurses  150  95  55  39  11  5  0.33  0.29  0.04 
Notes: This table reports descriptive results of the experiment. (a) All occupations where the share of females is lower than 2/3 (b) All occupations where 
the share of females is between 1/3 and 2/3 (c) All occupations where the share of females is greater than 1/3. The share of females in each occupation is 
taken from Statistics Sweden (2006).   30 
Table 3. The probability of callback for interview.       
  Model 1    Model 2    Model 3 
   








Female  0.03*** 
[0.01] 
           
Occupation               
  Male-dominated        -0.04 
[0.03] 
     
    Computer professionals              0.01 
[0.05] 








               




     




    Lower secondary school teachers 








               




     




















    Lower secondary school teachers 








Notes: This table reports effects from discrete changes in the independent variables on the probability 
of being invited for interview using probit regressions with the number of observations being 3,228. 
Column 1 reports the average effect on the probability of being a female applicant compared to a male 
applicant. Model 2 reports the effects on the probability of applying in the categories mixed and female-
dominated occupations compared to in male-dominated occupations. The category variables are also 
interacted with the female dummy to reveal any differences between males and females within the 
categories. Model 3 reports corresponding effects as Model 2 but on the occupational level. *, **, and *** 
denote  the  ten,  five  and  one  percent  significance  level,  respectively.  Reported  standard  errors  (in 
brackets) are adjusted for clustering on workplace.   31 
Table 4. Factors influencing difference in callback rate. 






  Female 
dominated 
occupations 
    1  2    3  4    5  6 
















































Occupational fixed effects    No  Yes    No  Yes    No  Yes 
Firm size fixed effects    No  Yes    No  Yes    No  Yes 
Number of cases    462  462    738  738    1.796  1.796 
Notes: This table reports the interaction effects between the female dummy and different firm and workplace 
characteristics on the probability of being invited for interview. These are the estimated marginal changes in the 
probability  for  the  continuous  variables  and  estimated discrete  changes  for  dummy  variables  *,  **,  and  *** 
denote the ten, five and one percent significance level respectively. Reported standard errors (in brackets) are 
adjusted for clustering on workplace. 